TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Iraq at the Boiling Point
By Samuel R. Berger

20 April 2004

It was one year ago that Saddam Hussein’s statue crashed to the ground in Baghdad; four months ago that he was captured. Yet, since the start of this month, 105 U.S. troops and over 1,000 Iraqis have been killed. Civilians from a number of countries have been taken hostage. Suicide attacks, roadside ambushes and heavy fighting have dominated the news. Even before what President Bush called these “tough weeks,” coalition troops were facing down dozens of attacks each day.

That is not to say that many good people in Iraq – American and Iraqi – are not accomplishing good things in many parts of the country. Under the most trying circumstances, our troops have shown truly inspiring skill and courage. The Coalition Provisional Authority has worked tirelessly to move reconstruction forward. The Iraqi people have high hopes and expectations for their future. We should have nothing less.

But we’ll never be able to meet those high hopes if we don’t get security and governance right. And I think it’s clear that pressures in Iraq are reaching the boiling point.

Mr. Chairman, the outcome of the enterprise in Iraq will help define our world for a generation. We could have a stable, secure, peaceful and pluralistic Iraq, which will have a positive impact on the entire region. Or we could have an Iraq that is slipping into chaos, civil war or radicalism, redefining not only Iraq but the region and our relationship with it. Imagine if Iraq becomes a failed, terror state. Imagine a fundamentalist nation next door to Iran. Imagine a country that fragments, drawing in its neighbors. Imagine the shadow such an Iraq would cast on our security. We cannot permit that to happen.

The president passionately and properly declared in his press conference last week that we cannot “cut and run.” But honestly, I don’t hear many people saying we should. The American people don’t want to cut and run. They want to know how we get from here to there.

And the fact is, many of the choices that brought us to “here” do not fully inspire confidence.

We ignored the cautions of people like General Eric Shinseki, who said the peace would be harder than the war. If we had put the same number of troops in Iraq per capita as we did at the outset in Kosovo – 6 to 1 instead of 20 to 1 – we would have 500,000 troops there today – or compared to Bosnia 350,000. Instead, we left ourselves ill-equipped to stem looting, establish order, even protect our own troops. Meanwhile, the notion that we could create and train an effective Iraqi army or police in a matter of months never made sense.

At the core, we put a higher value on maintaining control than on sharing risk. We and the British declared ourselves occupying powers. As a result, we are bearing close to 90% of the costs and risks.

We’ve fallen way behind on our own schedule for reconstruction. Of the $18.4 billion supplemental for aid to Iraq, only $2.1 billion has been obligated and 20% now will go to security. As you’ve said, Mr. Chairman, many Iraqis don’t understand “how the most powerful nation in the world could defeat their armed forces in three weeks and still have trouble getting the lights on.”

And despite the uncertain situation on the ground, we set an arbitrary date for transferring sovereignty -- before we knew to whom, and before we had broad agreement on a formula for multiethnic rule.

Mr. Chairman, I find disconcerting the administration’s jarring certainty about June 30 and its jarring uncertainty about July 1.

We have been told “where” we want to go – Iraqi sovereignty, American-led security and eventually Iraqi elections. We haven’t been told “how we plan to get there.” The American people need to know we have a confident and workable plan. There is too much at stake in Iraq to lose the American people.

As I see it, we have three basic options: Apply more force, hunker down or make a serious effort to internationalize the enterprise.

First, applying more force. This may be necessary in some cases. If our military commanders say they need more troops, then they should have them.

But we also must recognize the risks of military solutions in the absence of a clear political strategy. Attempting to crush the opposition can create its own dangerous backlash.

Our military strategy will be no better than our political strategy, and our political strategy, while allaying the concerns of the Sunnis and the Kurds, must empower legitimate and respected Shia moderates. If we lose the Shia population’s support, then we will lose Iraq.

Our second option is to “hunker down” – to replace the CPA sign with one that says “U.S. Embassy,” turn sovereignty over to an as-yet undetermined group of Iraqis, and try to stay out of harm’s way.

Mr. Chairman, this option is a prescription for chaos. It is unrealistic to think a new Iraqi leadership will be equipped to govern on July 1, much less prepared to send troops to this or the next Fallujah. As Lt. Gen. Sanchez has said, “We know that it’s going to take us a while to stand up reliable forces that can accept responsibility.”

Our third option is one that many of us have advocated all along. It would have been easier to implement a year ago… six months ago… last month. That is a genuine, non-grudging effort to internationalize the enterprise in Iraq, both military and civilian.

I welcome the fact that the administration is finally coming to that view. By last week’s press conference, the president was deferring critical decisions on Iraq’s future government to UN representative Lakhdar Brahimi.

Mr. Brahimi has proposed a caretaker government and a consultative assembly. These make sense. But, as Senator Biden has noted, there is a gap in what Mr. Brahimi is suggesting. On the civilian side there will be some new Iraqi authority – hopefully broad-based and more widely supported than the current one we selected. There will be a large U.S. Embassy presence. But in the absence of an international High Commissioner of some sort, supported by a consortium of key countries including not only the United States but also European and Arab, the newly formed Iraqi government will not have the capacity to act strongly… and they will be reluctant to cooperate too openly with our behemoth American Embassy, even in the hands of someone as capable as Ambassador Negroponte. There needs to be an international mechanism that reinforces the exercise of Iraqi executive authority and, quite honestly, facilitates the ability of the United States to function more effectively with that Iraqi leadership.

We also need a troop presence in Iraq that is genuinely international.

Some argue it’s too late to obtain help from the allies. I disagree. Like us, our partners in Europe and the Arab world will bear the full brunt of an Iraq that fails – an Iraq in turmoil. The fact that they did not participate in the invasion will provide them, in the end, no comfort.

Senator Biden, I support your proposal that President Bush should call for an immediate summit with our European and Arab friends, representatives of the UN and NATO… say we need their help… and ask them what their meaningful engagement would take. So far, we’ve said we’d welcome their troops and their money – but largely on our terms. We’ve got to be prepared to give up our hammer-lock on decision-making in exchange for genuine burden-sharing.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, let me say again that we will not meet any of our goals in Iraq if we lose the public at home.

Today the question on the public mind is: What is our strategy for success in Iraq, and is it achievable? Our current policy seems to involve a significant element of improvisation. And while yes, we are willing to stay the course if we know what that course is, my fear, to borrow Yogi Berra’s words, is that if we don’t know where we’re going, we will end up somewhere else.

More troops and more money is not a strategy. Steadfastness is an imperative – but it is not a strategy. Americans need to hear a plan to stem the insurgency, disarm the militias, hasten reconstruction, and, most important, enable Iraqis themselves to forge consensus on the future of their country.

Sitting here today, I still believe we can do that. I still believe the Iraqi people can do it. But success requires international support… and we don’t have a moment to waste.

Thank you

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