A Nuclear North, All Over Again
Today's world would be far more dangerous
had the Agreed Framework not been in place
By Samuel R. Berger and Robert L. Gallucci
12 May 2003 Edition
The impression of deja vu all over again is irresistible. It was exactly
a decade ago that North Korea got caught cheating by International Atomic
Energy Agency inspectors, with the help of American intelligence. It had
lied about how much plutonium it had produced in the 1980s. The North
then threw out the inspectors, announced it was pulling out of the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and made some bellicose noises.
The United States responded by threatening U.N. sanctions, but also by
going to the negotiating table, and staying there, off and on, for 16
months. The only condition for talks was that the North allow inspectors
to return to ensure that no more plutonium was separated while we talked.
The result was the Agreed Framework of 1994 that effectively stopped the
North’s plutonium program, one that would otherwise have produced
enough material by now for about 100 nuclear weapons. Today’s world
would be far more dangerous had the framework not been in place.
Last October we learned that once again American intelligence caught
the North cheating—the goal this time was not plutonium but highly
enriched uranium. As before, the inspectors were thrown out, the North
said it was pulling out of the NPT, and it has again resorted to saber
rattling.
The similarities between the two nuclear confrontations are striking—but
so are the strategic differences. First, this time North Korea admits
it has a secret uranium-enrichment program, and claims it already has
some nuclear weapons. Second, over the last 10 years Pyongyang has deployed
medium-range missiles that can reach Japan, and is closer to producing
longer-range missiles that would reach the United States. Third, many
in South Korea now believe the United States is as responsible for the
standoff as the North. And finally, among the North’s newest threats
was reportedly the suggestion that it might consider selling nuclear weapons
to the highest bidder.
What should Washington do this time? Sanctions are always appealing
when dealing with rogue nations because they do not require talks, they
involve direct action without the risks of military action and they can
have broad multilateral appeal. Unfortunately, sanctions will not force
Pyongyang to give up its nukes because China will not allow the North
to be driven to the brink of collapse.
The only option more attractive than sanctions is one or another version
of a “free lunch,” where the United States does nothing, but
the problem goes away. The first version—let the Chinese solve it—would
have Beijing exert its influence on Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons
in order to avoid having the United States use military force on China’s
doorstep, or worse, to avoid seeing Japan acquire nuclear weapons to deter
a nuclear North. The second version would build upon our victory in Iraq,
and a not-so-implicit threat of regime change, to force the North Koreans
to back down. The problem with these options is that China is not likely
to encourage North Korea’s collapse, and Iraq, ironically, may be
heating up the North’s nuclear program, not chilling it. Both are
prescriptions for slow-motion failure, and time is not on our side.
There is, then, the military option. It could be an air strike against
the nuclear facilities we can locate, or an invasion to remove Kim Jong
Il, as some in the Bush administration favor. The problem with the military
option is that estimates of American and Korean casualties in a war on
the peninsula run from the tens of thousands to the hundreds of thousands
or more. It would not be another gulf war; it would be another Korean
War. And this time the South Koreans might well not be with us, though
they certainly would suffer horrendous loss of life as if they were. This
option cannot be ruled out, but we should have no illusions about the
costs.
This brings us back to negotiation. The problems here are that there
are deep divisions within the Bush administration, much of which characterizes
any engagement with the North as a reward for bad behavior. Worse, the
president seems to accept the view that we can embrace diplomacy while
flatly rejecting negotiation. The fact is that negotiation usually means
that both sides give something to get more. The real test is whether a
deal that benefits us can be achieved. The Agreed Framework did not solve
the North Korean nuclear problem permanently, but we are better off for
having made the deal. Could we do better this time, making it harder for
them to cheat again? Of course. Is the North’s opening position,
as reported, unreasonable? Absolutely. This is how we began talks a decade
ago: they want something and they are prepared to negotiate; we want something
and we should be prepared to negotiate to determine whether we can reach
an agreement that advances our national interest.
The only other option is to accept North Korea’s nuclear-weapons
program and to contain and isolate the regime. Not only does this risk
an Asian nuclear-arms race, but a far worse world where North Korea is
a nuclear-weapons factory for the likes of Al Qaeda. And that is one outcome
that truly is unacceptable.
—Berger was national-security adviser in the Clinton administration
and is chairman of Stonebridge International, a global-strategy firm.
Gallucci was assistant secretary of State in the Bush and Clinton administrations
and is dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.
Return to Prior Years News 
Return to In the News
Back to Top^
About | Services
| Expertise | Publications
| News | Partners
|
